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STA TEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jana Moffett appeals from the Order of the magistrate divorce court dividing the 
property, assets, and debts of the parties, as well as the denial of her request for spousal 
maintenance and attorney fees. She also appeals from the Order Amending the Division of 
Property and the Order Altering and Amending Decree. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
lana Moffett, herein after Mrs. Moffett, is the Appellant in this proceeding. Brian 
Moffett, herein after Mr. Moffett, is the Respondent. Brian and Jana Moffett were officially 
divorced by order of Magistrate Judge Griffin on July 28, 2004. R. at pg 30. However, all issues, 
other than the entry of the Decree divorcing the parties, were reserved. R. at pg 30. 
On August 11,2004, a subsequent Order was entered that divided the parties' property, 
assets, and debts, established the custody ofthe parties three children and set monthly child 
support amounts to be paid by Mr. Moffett to Mrs. Moffett. The Court further denied Mrs. 
Moffett's request for spousal maintenance, as well as both parties' requests for attorney fees. R. 
at pg 32-44. 
Specifically, this Order did not mention Mr. Moffett's 401K retirement account, but did 
order him to reimburse Mrs. Moffett for voluntary contributions made to the 401 K during their 
separation, approximately $2,375, and assigned him any debt against the 40IK. R. at pg 40. The 
Order required Mr. Moffett to pay Mrs. Moffett $1,925 in monthly child support. R. at pg 38. 
This amount included $165 per week to be paid for Mrs. Moffett's work related child care. R. at 
pg 38. It also gave Mr. Moffett an offset of $186 per year for what he paid in medical insurance 
for the children, even though testimony at trial established this amount as $162. R. at pg 38. The 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -- 5 
thirty (30) acre real property awarded to Mr. Moffett was assigned a value of $450,000. R. at pg 
36. This was based on the testimony of Mr. Moffett during examination by Mrs. Moffets' trial 
attorney during the July 26 and 27,2004 trial that he thought this particular property and house 
could be worth up to $450,000. R. at Appellant's Exhibit 2, Transcript of Motion Hearing, 
November 10, 2004, page 74, line 15-24. This was despite the testimony of a Mr. Engledow, 
who testified that this property was listed for $385,000 currently, was only worth $380,000 at the 
time of trial, and could potentially be worth $420,000 to $450,000 when the house on the 
property was actually finished. R. at Appellant's Exhibit 2, Transcript of Motion Hearing, 
November 10, 2004, page 42, line 16 through page 43, line 17. 
On August 16,2004, Mrs. Moffett's attorney filed a Motion to Correct Order Regarding 
Division of Property and Debt. R. at pg 48-52. On August 24, 2004, Mr. Moffett's trial counsel 
filed a Motion to Alter and/or Amend Order Dated August 11,2004. R. at pg 57-67. On August 
24, 2004, Judge Griffin entered an Order Amending Division of Property which noted that he 
had intended to award the 401K and all debt upon it to Mr. Moffett. R. at pg 68. An appeal order 
was also granted by the district court on September 23,2004. R. on pg 82-83. From October 13, 
2004 through November 5, 2004, Mrs. Moffett's attorney filed a series of notices, motions and 
affidavits alleging Mr. Moffett was in contempt of court for failure to pay child support and 
abide by the court's division of property. R. at pg 84-122. 
On November 10, 2004, a hearing on the various motions presented by each party was 
held before Judge Griffin. R. at pg 132. On November 16, 2004, an Order Altering and 
Amending Decree was issued by Judge Griffin. R. at pg 132-36. This new order noted that it 
was reducing Mr. Moffett's monthly child support obligations to $1,337 because the court had 
misread Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 6( c)(6), Section 8(a), erroneously included work related 
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child care in the child support order, and offset Mr. Moffett's yearly payments for the children's 
medical insurance by the wrong amount. R. at pg 134-35. Mr. Moffett was found to be in 
contempt of court for failure to pay child support. R. at pg 135. 
The actual appeal opinion from Hon. John Bradbury of the Second Judicial District Court 
for this matter was not issued until December 23, 2009. R. at pg 317. This delay was caused by 
Mr. Moffett filing for bankruptcy in 2005 and the corresponding stays. R. at pg 145-50. The 
District Court affirmed the trial court's division of the assets as substantially equal, reduction of 
child support obligations despite Mr. Moffett being in contempt of court at the time, denial of 
spousal maintenance, and denial of attorney fees. R. at pg 317-31. Mrs. Moffett timely appealed 
the District Court's decision affirming the trial court's rulings. R. at pg 333-38. 
ISSUES 
Because Mrs. Moffett does not state the issues on appeal as questions, but rather 
assertions of error and/or arguments (Appellant's Briefpg 9), they are not repeated here. The 
Respondent rephrases the issues as: 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or incorrectly follow the law in altering the 
Respondent's child support obligations? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's request for attorney fees 
and costs? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to substantially equally divide the 
parties' assets, property, and debts, and/or, in the alternative, was there substantial 
evidence on the record to support the trial court's claimed equitable division of the 
parties assets, property, and debts or was it an abuse of discretion? 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's request for spousal 
maintenance? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When an appellate court reviews a case appealed from a district court's appellate review 
of a magistrate's decision, the Court reviews the decision of the magistrate, independently of, but 
with due regard for, the decision of the district court. Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596, 
599,21 P.3d 918, 921 (2001). Where the magistrate's findings of fact are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, the magistrate's decision 
will not be disturbed on appeal. ld (citing Stonecipher v. Stonecipher, 131 Idaho 731, 734, 963 
P.2d 1168, 1171 (1998)). However, the Court freely reviews issues oflaw.ld 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion And/Or Misapply The Law In Altering 
Respondent's Child Support Obligations Because The Trial Judge Had Erroneously 
Included Work Related Child Care In The Child Support Amount, In Contradiction ofthe 
Idaho Child Support Guidelines. 
A. Introduction 
The interpretation of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (IRCP) is a matter oflaw over 
which this Court has free review. Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 234 P.3d 699, 704 (2010). 
Even if trial counselor trial counsel have mislabeled the particular procedural stance of a motion 
for relief under IRCP 59 or 60, an appellant court may still evaluate whether the relief granted 
was proper under these rules. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 229 P.3d 1146, 1158 (2010). In 
general, a trial court's decision whether to grant relief pursuant to these rules is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. ld. The decision will be upheld if it appears that the trial court (1) correctly 
perceived the issue as discretionary, (2) acted within the boundaries of its discretion and 
consistent with the applicable legal standards, and (3) reached its determination through an 
exercise of reason. ld. However, when a decision on relief is not discretionary, like a request for 
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relief under IRCP 60(b)( 4), the appellate court is to exercise free review of the decision as a 
question oflaw. Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571,577212 P.3d 1001, 1007 (2009). 
The general law in Idaho is that a trial court is without authority to modify a child support 
order when the party moving for modification is in contempt and cannot show that for reasons 
beyond his control, the arrearages cannot be purged. Nab v. Nab, 114 Idaho 512, 518, 757 P.2d 
1231, 1237 (Ct.App.1988) (rejecting the more rigid standard cited by Appellant in Hoagland v. 
Hoagland, 67 Idaho 67, 170 P.2d 609 (1946)). A party can be held in contempt if they fail to 
pay court ordered child support, knew of their child support obligation and had the ability to pay 
the child support. !d. However, Nab has not been established as over-ruling or trumping other 
portions of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On August 24, 2004, Mr. Moffett's trial counsel filed a Motion to Alter and/or Amend 
Order Dated August 11. R. at pg 57-67. This motion pointed out that a more proper placement 
of the $165 weekly work related child day care expenses ordered as part of August 11 Order was 
to order Mr. Moffett to pay a portion of the costs, based on Idaho Child Support Income ratio, 
directly to the care provider or Mrs. Moffett. R. at pg 59. A Motion for Contempt was filed by 
Mrs. Moffett's attorney on October 13,2004. R. at pg 108-10. On November 10,2004, the trial 
court conducted a hearing on both parties' Motions to Alter/Amend and the Contempt action. R. 
at pg 132. At this hearing, both parties testified. R. at pg 132. The judge stated in his November 
16,2004 Order Altering and Amending Decree that he considered Mr. Moffett's motion to alter 
and/or amend as one to present new evidence. R. at pg 132-33. However, the judge did find Mr. 
Moffett in contempt of court for failure to pay child support. R. at pg 135. 
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B. The relief granted by the trial court was proper under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
59 
The trial judge's order to reduce child support was a new trial on the issue of child 
support rather than a traditional motion to modify child support contemplated by Nab and its 
progeny. IRCP 59 allows for either party or the court to apply for a new trial on the entirety of 
issues presented or selected ones. IRCP 59(a)(4) allows for a new trial on any issue in the 
instance of newly discovered evidence material to the moving party that could not have been 
discovered with reasonable diligence and presented at trial. This could be a ground for a new 
trial on the issue of child support because it was only discovered after the trial that Mrs. Moffett 
did not use the $165 per week child care costs included in the child support order against Mr. 
Moffett. R. at pg 134. 
Another ground for a new trial on the issue of child support is IRCP 59(a)(7). This 
subsection provides for error in law providing a viable new trial ground. IRCP 59 does allow for 
a new trial on an issue where there was insufficient evidence and errors of law. Coombs v. 
Curnow, 148 Idaho 129,219 P.3d 453,462 (2009). The trial judge noted in the Order Altering 
or Amending Decree, dated November 16,2004, that he had reviewed IRCP 6(c)(6), Section 8(a) 
and realized that he had improperly calculated child support in the August 11, 2004 Order. R. at 
pg 131-32. I R. In particular, he had erroneously included work related child care at $165 per 
week in the child support order and given the amount of medical insurance Mr. Moffett paid for 
the children as $186 per year when it was actually $162 per year. R. at pg 134-35. Because of 
I IRCP 6(c)(6), Section 8(a) at the time of these orders read: "Child Care Costs. A basic child support award does 
not cover work related child care expenses. The court may order a sharing of reasonable work related child care 
expenses, incurred by wither party in proportion to their Guideline Income. If ordered, these payments shall be paid 
directly between the parties, unless agreed otherwise. The court may consider whether the federal child care tax 
credit for such a minor is available as a benefit to a parent." 
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these errors, Judge Griffin ordered Mr. Moffett to pay $1,337 in monthly child support, instead 
of $1,925 per month as previously ordered. 
C. The relief granted by the trial court was proper under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
60 
The Order Altering and Amending Decree was proper underneath IRCP 60(a). IRCP 
60(a) allows for a court on its own initiative to correct clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or 
other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission. IRCP applies to 
the "type of mistake or omission [is] mechanical in nature which is apparent in the record and 
which does not involve a legal decision or judgment by an attorney." Silsby v. Kepner, 140 Idaho 
410,95 P.3d 28 (2004) (citing Dursteler v. Dursteler, 112 Idaho 594, 597, 733 P.2d 815, 818 
(Ct.App.1987)). The error in this case, as corrected by the Order Altering and Amending 
Decree, was a mechanical error that was apparent from the record and did not involve a legal 
decision or judgment by an attorney. The judge noted he had read the Idaho Child Support 
Guidelines incorrectly and that work related child care is properly addressed as each parties' pro 
rata share in accordance with the Guideline Income, payable directly between each party unless 
otherwise agreed. R. at pg 131-35. 
In the alternative that the miscalculation of child support was not a clerical error, as 
contemplated under IRCP 60(b), it was an error justifying relief under IRCP 60(b)(1), (4) or (6). 
IRCP 60(b)(1) allows for relief to a party from a final judgment, order or proceeding if there was 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. IRCP 60(b)(4) allows for relief from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding if the judgment is void. IRCP 60(b)(6) allows for relief 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding if there is any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The decision to grant or deny relief under IRCP 60(b) is committed 
to the discretion of the trial court when the underlying ground for reliefis discretionary and a 
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matter oflaw when the underlying ground is not discretionary. Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731,228 
P .3d 998, 1001 (2010). IRCP 60(b) does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding. 
The original August 11, 2994 order contained a judicial mistake as it pertained to child 
support calculation, making Mr. Moffett eligible for relief. If the trial court applies the facts in a 
logical manner to the criteria set forth in IRCP 60(b)(1), while keeping in mind the policy 
favoring relief in doubtful cases, the court will be deemed to have acted within its discretion. 
Jonsson v. Oxborrow, 141 Idaho 635, 638, 115 P.3d 726, 729 (2005). In this matter, the trial 
judge stated that his review of the IRCP 6(c)(6), Section 8(a), revealed that he had incorrectly 
included work related child care expenses as part of the monthly child support payments. R. at pg 
134. He stated in the Order Altering and Amending Decree that he was changing the child 
support amount to correct the mistake he made in the original order. R. at pg 134-35. Therefore, 
Judge Griffin did not abuse his discretion in granting Mr. Moffett relief under IRCP 60(b)(1). 
The original August 11, 2004 order was void, making Mr. Moffett eligible for relief 
under IRCP 60(b)(4). The trial judge noted in the Order Altering and Amending Decree that his 
previous order was invalid under IRCP 6(c)(6), Section 8(a). R. at pg 134-35. He did not make 
any special findings on the record or otherwise that be required to deviate from the Idaho Child 
Support Guidelines. Rat pg 36-38. He did incorrectly add what appears to be a weekly lump 
sum work related child support figure to the monthly child support payments required of Mr. 
Moffett. R. at pg 38. He did correct this invalid aspect of the original order with the Order 
Altering and Amending Decree. R. at pg 134-35. Therefore, the alteration of the original order 
was valid under IRCP 60(b)( 4). 
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Other special and unique reasons justify relief for Mr. Moffett under IRCP 60(b )(6). 
IRCP 60(b)(6) is the catch all provision ofIRCP 60(b), but it still requires there to be unique and 
compelling circumstances' justifying relief. Eby, 228 P .3d at 1003. This case present unique and 
compelling circumstances justifying relief because a decision otherwise eviscerates the inherent 
discretion of a court to correct obvious errors of law. Despite the fact that Mr. Moffett was in 
contempt of court for failure to pay child support, the trial judge's decision to amend the 
previous order is not based on granting an advantage to Mr. Moffett. Instead, Judge Griffin 
recognized that he had incorrectly applied the applicable law and sought to correct this mistake. 
That this mistake benefited Mr. Moffett is secondary to the correction of judicial error. The Nab 
line of cases only deals with a petitioner trying to modifY child support because of decreased 
income. They do not contemplate the original judge making a clearly recognized error in 
applying the Guidelines and later fixing this error. Therefore, the alteration of the original order 
was valid under IRCP 60(b)(6). 
In Silsby, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed a magistrate's decision altering a default 
divorce decree as it related to child support because the original decree failed to give Kepner the 
income tax exemption set off that was required under the statute when the income tax exemption 
was awarded to Silsby. 140 Idaho 412, 416,95 P.3d 30, 34 (Ct.App.2003). This case presents 
facts substantially similar to this matter.2 It involved a judicial error by the trial judge over 
calculating child support offsets. Id at 413. The petitioner in that case was in contempt for 
2 Silsby may be fatal to Respondent's arguments that the trial judge's actions were proper under IRCP 60(a), but 
does point to supporting precedent for relief under IRCP 60(b). On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court of 
Appeals decision was reversed on the ground that IRCP 60(b) was proper instead of60(a) because the magistrate's 
mistake was deemed to not be a "clerical error." 140 Idaho 410,95 P.3d 28 (2004). However, the Supreme Court 
did not deny that the magistrate had authority under IRCP 60(b) to alter the judgment, even ifthe moving party's 
petition to modify was invalid because of failure to pay child support. [d. at 412. 
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failure to pay child support. Id. The judge altered the original child support judgment entered 
two years prior in accordance with IRCP 60. Id.. 
The trial judge in this case considered the motion to alter and/or amend filed by both 
parties as IRCP 60(b) motions. Judge Griffin acknowledged at the hearing for the various 
motions on November 10,2004 that he believed the motions' stance to be one of an IRCP 60(b) 
motion. R. at Appellant's Exhibit 2, pg 7, line 5-18. Mr. Moffett was found to be in contempt 
for failure to pay child support, even if the child support was calculated in error. R. at pg 135. 
Judge Griffin stated that he did not have any intention to modify the child support amounts based 
on changes or miscalculations in income. R. at pg 134. However, he decided to modify the 
amount for child support when his review of the Idaho Child Support Guidelines clearly showed 
he had made an error in his assignment of work related child care. R. at pg 133-34. All ofthese 
factors indicate that Judge Griffin saw the change in child support as being a relief from the 
incorrect judgment entered in the original order. 
D. Conclusion 
Judge Griffin did not abuse his discretion in altering the amount of child support owed by 
Mr. Moffett. He recognized that he had discretion to correct mistakes that would make the 
divorce decree more equitable. He acted within the outer limits of his discretion in amending an 
order that incorrectly incorporated work related child care. He also did this by an exercise of 
reason, as seen by his careful discussion in the Order Altering and Amending Decree. R. at pg. 
134-35. Therefore, he did not abuse his discretion in issuing the Order Altering and Amending 
Decree as it relates to child support amounts. 
Granting relief to Mr. Moffett for Judge Griffin's earlier mistake oflaw is correct as a 
matter oflaw and thus entitIes him to relief. IRCP 6(c)(6), Section 8(a) clearly sets out that work 
related child care is not included in child support. There is always an exception to the 
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application Guidelines if the trial judge makes a specific finding of facts for why a deviation is 
proper. However, Judge Griffin made no such finding in his original order. R. at 36-39. In his 
discussion of the prior order, Judge Griffin noted that he had misread the Guidelines and did not 
mean to deviate from them. R. at pg 134-35. Therefore, Judge Griffin's alteration of the original 
order as it relates to child support was correct as a matter of law and Mr. Moffett was properly 
granted relief 
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Appellant's Request For 
Attorney Fees. 
A. Introduction 
Awards of attorney fees in divorce proceedings are governed by Idaho Code § 32-704(3). 
In part, this statute states that a "court may from time to time after considering the financial 
resources of both parties and the factors set forth in I.C. § 32-705[,] order a party to pay a 
reasonable amount for the cost to the other party." I.C. §32-704(3). A decision by a trial court to 
deny or grant attorney fees to a party in a divorce proceeding is a matter of discretion. Stephens 
v. Stephens, 138 Idaho 195, 197,61 P.3d 63,96 (Ct.App.2002). This decision will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Perez v. Perez, 
125 Idaho 667, 671, 873 P.2d 921, 925 (Ct.App.1994)). 
The test for whether a trial court has abused its discretion in relation to attorney fees is a 
three tiered analysis. Stewart v. Stewart. 143 Idaho 673, 679-680, 152 P.3d 544, 550-51 (2007). 
The first tier is whether the Magistrate correctly viewed the issue of spousal maintenance as one 
of discretion. Id. (citing Chandler v. Chandler, 136 Idaho 246, 249, 32 P.3d 140, 143 (2001)). 
The second is whether the Court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices. Id. Lastly is, whether the 
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. 
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B. The Trial Court Correctly Followed The Applicable Legal Standards In Its 
Discretionary Decision To Deny Appellant's Claim For Attorney Fees 
Appellant erroneously cites Stephens as standing for a proposition that disparity in 
income is a per se standard for awarding attorney fees. While it is true that the Court in Stephens 
stated: "[t]here are Idaho appellate decisions stating that a disparity in the income of the parties is 
generally sufficient to justify an award of attorney fees under § 32-704." 138 Idaho at 196, 61 
P.3d at 64 (citing Jensen v. Jensen, 128 Idaho 600, 606, 917 P.2d 757, 763 (1996); Pieper v. 
Pieper, 125 Idaho 667, 671, 873 P.2d 921,925 (C1.App.1994)). It is also true the Court goes on 
to state, "there are other Idaho cases which suggest that income inequality would not justify an 
award if the requesting party has sufficient other financial resources to pay his or her attorney 
fees." Id. (citing Jensen, 128 Idaho at 606,917 P.2d at 763; Irelandv. Ireland, 123 Idaho 955, 
960,855 P.2d 40, 45 (1993); Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61-62, 714 P.2d 26,30-31 (1986); 
Ross v. Ross, 103 Idaho 406, 410, 648 P.2d 1119, 1123 (1982); Parker v. Parker, 97 Idaho 209, 
215,541 P.2d 1177, 1183 (1975); Perez, 134 Idah0555, 558, 6 P.3d 411,414 (Idaho App. 2000). 
At best, Stephens stands for the proposition that disparity in income is a factor, whether under 
"financial resources" in I.C. § 32-704(3) or the factors listed in I.C. § 32-705, but is not the a 
priori and definitive factor. 
While Judge Griffin did not specifically enumerate his reasons for denying Appellant's 
attorney fees request, he weighed all of the proper factors in his denial of Appellant's request for 
spousal maintenance. The proper factors in considering an award of attorney fees in a divorce 
action are the financial resources of both parties and the factors set forth in I.C. § 32-705. I.C. § 
32-704(3). In Judge Griffin's Order from August 11,2004, "Spousal Maintenance" section, he 
discusses ten (10) separate areas of inquiry that he evaluated in making his decision to deny 
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Appellant's request for spousal maintenance. R. at pg. 39. These areas of inquiry were based on 
the factors enumerated in I.C. § 32-705. R. at pg. 39. These factual findings included: 
(1) Awarding each party an equal share ofthe parties' assets (R at pg. 40), 
(2) That in the Appellant's share of the assets was a stock account and a 
checking account worth approximately $ 24,065 and easy to liquidate (R at 
pg.40), 
(3) That the Appellant was awarded approximately $ 100,000 in equity from 
personal and real property, compared to roughly the same for the 
Respondent (R at pg. 41-42), 
(4) That the Appellant was currently employed full time and even worked some 
overtime as a unit supervisor for the emergency room at Tri-State Hospital, 
making approximately $ 15,000 per year, and that the Respondent was 
employed by Alaska Airlines earning approximately $ 66,000 per year (R at 
pg.36), 
(5) That the Appellant was interested in becoming a registered nurse and would 
need two more years of education to accomplish this goal (R at pg. 39), 
(6) That the parties were married for thirteen (13) years (R at pg. 39), 
(7) That the Appellant was thirty six (36) years old (R at pg. 39), 
(8) That the Appellant recently had a gallbladder surgery, might have to have a 
hysterectomy, and noted her neurological disorder (R at pg. 39) 
(9) Tax implications were generally discussed in a variety of contexts (R at pg. 
38 and 40), and 
(10) He also noted that both parties had engaged in openly adulterous 
relationships during the marriage and that the Respondent had been violent 
towards the Appellant after the separation (R at pg. 37). 
C. Conclusion 
Judge Griffin did not abuse his discretion in denying Appellant's request for attorney 
fees. The Record shows that Judge Griffin properly considered the issue of attorney fees as one 
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of discretion in applying and evaluating the factors set out in I.C. §§ 32-704(3) and § 32-705. 
This decision was within the outer limits of the Court's discretion and applied the proper legal 
standards. The proper legal standards, I.C §§. 32-704(3) and § 32-705, in making his ruling. 
This ruling was within the outer limits of the Court's discretion when previous cases have upheld 
a denial of attorney fees when there was a $ 55,000 to $ 192,000 discrepancy in income under 
similar circumstances. Jensen, 128 Idaho at 602,917 P.2d at 759. It is also clear that Judge 
Griffin arrived at his decision via an exercise of reason. All of the relevant statutory factors were 
noted and applied to the facts of the case. Additionally, Judge Griffin did not act in a punitive 
manner or outside the outer limits of the Court's discretion in reaching his decision. Therefore, 
in applying the three tiered analysis of Chandler, the Magistrate below did not abuse his 
discretion and the denial of attorney fees to the Appellant should be affirmed. 
III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Making A Substantially Equal 
Distribution of Assets, Properties, And Debts, And/Or, In The Alternative, Did Not 
Abuse Its Discretion In Equitably Dividing The Assets, Properties, And Debts Of The 
Parties. 
A. Introduction 
In Idaho divorce cases, the magistrate judge has a duty to not only dissolve a marriage 
but also to equitably divide the community's assets and property. Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 
212,220,192 P.3d 1036,1044 (2008). Idaho Code § 32-712(1) provides that "unless there are 
compelling reasons otherwise, there shall be a substantially equal division in value." The 
decision to distribute the community's property substantially equal or by other equitable means 
is committed to the discretion ofthe trial court. Donndelinger v. Donndelinger, 107 Idaho 431, 
690 P.2d 366 (Ct.App. 1984). Although substantially equal is preferred, exact mathematical 
precision in dividing property is impossible. Shepard v. Shepard, 94 Idaho 734,497 P.2d 321, 
322 (1972). 
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The standard of review used to determine whether an equitable division of property was 
proper is dependent on whether the trial judge was attempting to make a substantially equal 
distribution or some other equitable distribution. Bailey v. Bailey, 107 Idaho 324, 327-8, 689 
P.2d 216, 219-20 (Ct.App.1984). If the trial judge attempted to divide the property substantially 
equal, than the reviewing court will not overturn the division ifthere is substantial evidence on 
the record to support the division. /d. at 327. Ifthe trial judge intended to make some equitable 
distribution other than a substantially equal one, the division is reviewed under the abuse of 
discretion standard. Id. at 328. Substantial evidence is "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind 
might accept to support a conclusion." Pearl v. Bd. of Profl Discipline of Idaho State Bd. of 
Med., 137 Idaho 107, 112,44 P.3d 1162, 1167 (2002). Substantial evidence is more than a 
scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance." Id. 
B. The trial court intended to make a substantially equal distribution 
The trial judge clearly intended to make a substantially equal distribution of community 
property and assets in this case. The opinion of Judge Griffin stated that, "Jana was awarded an 
equal share of the parties' assets, and some of those assets were liquid (her checking account and 
the Ameritrade stock account [combined value of$24,065 per the opinion]). R. at pg 40. 
Therefore, the standard of review is whether there is substantial evidence on the record to 
support the contention there was a substantially equal division of property. 
C. Appellant and Respondent each received a substantially equal share of the community 
There is substantial evidence that Mrs. Moffett received a substantially equal share of 
property. She was awarded $42,972 in personal property, which did not take into account the 
$3,000 she received from insurance proceeds for the 2002 Suburban. R. at pg 41-2. She was 
awarded real property that the Court valued at $250,000. R. at pg 42. This figure did not include 
the $550 yearly pasture rent income earned from the property awarded to her. R. at pg 40 & 42. 
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She was assigned liability for $127,000 in debt on the real property she was awarded. R. at pg 
43. She was also assigned community debt in the amount of$70,271.01. R. at pg 43. 
Additionally, she was awarded a $2,375 payment from Mr. Moffett for his contributions to the 
401 K during their time of separation. R. at pg. 40. In all, she was awarded a total net equity of 
$98,076.04, with $24,065 of that equity being liquid, and was awarded two hundred (200) out of 
two hundred thirty (230) acres of the community property. R. at pg 40-3. 
Mr. Moffett received a substantially equal share of the property. He was awarded 
$32,310 in personal property. R. at pg 42-3. He was awarded $450,000 in real property, 
according to Judge Griffin's opinion. R. at pg 43.3 He was awarded his 401K retirement account 
with Alaska Airlines valued at $26,920 for the actual retirement account. R. at pg 68 & 
Appellant's Exhibit 1, Transcript of Testimony of Brian Moffett, July 26,2004, page 26, line 6 
through pg 28, line 14. Mr. Moffett was also assigned the $13,624 debt assigned to the loan he 
took out from the 401K. R. at pg 43 & Appellant's Exhibit 1, Transcript of Testimony of Brian 
Moffett, July 26, 2004, page 26, line 6 through pg 28, line 14.4 He was also assigned $338,000 
in debt from the thirty (30) acres and home awarded to him. R. at pg 43. He was assigned 
$46,124.17 in community debt. R. at pg 43. He was also ordered to pay $2,375 to Mrs. Moffett 
3 There is not substantial evidence on the record that the main real property awarded to Mr. Moffett, the matrimonial 
home and 30 acres it was situated on, was worth the $450,000 value Judge Griffin assigned it. R. at Appellant's 
Exhibit 2, Transcript of Motion Hearing, November 10,2004, page 74, line 15-24. The only expert who testified as 
to the property value at the 2004 original trial was a Mr. Engledow, a realtor with over thirty years experience. R. at 
Appellant's Exhibit 2, Transcript of Motion Hearing, November 10,2004, page 74, line 15-24. He testified that the 
real property awarded to Mr. Moffett was valued at $385,000 at the time of the trial. R. at Appellant's Exhibit 2, 
Transcript of Motion Hearing, November 10,2004, page 42, line 16 through page 43, line 17. He testified that the 
property would be worth $420,000 to $450,000 when it was completed. R. at Appellant's Exhibit 2, Transcript of 
Motion Hearing, November 10,2004, page 42, line 16 through page 43, line 17. Mr. Moffett testified at the trial 
that he guessed the property would be worth $420,000 to $450,000 when completed. R. at Appellant's Exhibit 1, 
Transcript of Testimony of Brian Moffett, July 26, 2004, page 111, line 7-8. However, Mr. Moffett had assumed at 
that time that the value he was giving was for a finished property. R. at pg 185. It was also testified to at trial by Mr. 
Engledow that the house was priced to sell in the high $300,000's range and could be placed on the market for a 
maximum of$385,000 at the time of the trial. R. at pg 185. Therefore, the substantial evidence from the record 
indicates that the value given to the real property awarded to Mr. Moffett should be $380,000 to $390,000. 
4 The loan from the 40IK essentially cancels itself out in determining equity. The amount taken out of the 40IK 
loan is then directly paid back to the 401 K. 
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to reimburse her for payments he made to his 401 K during their separation. R. at pg. 42. He was 
only awarded $525 in liquid assets. R. at pg 42-3. If one accepts Judge Griffin's original note on 
the value of real property awarded to Mr. Moffett as $450,000, he was awarded a total net equity 
of$122,731.83. R. at pg 40-3. However, there are several things of note in this distribution. An 
almost complete majority ofMr. Moffett's net equity, $112,000 out of$122,731.83, was tied up 
in the real property he was awarded. If one adopts the highest possible value given the 
uncompleted home and 30 acres property awarded to Mr. Moffett by the expert witness at trial, 
$385,000, than his net equity was only $57,731.83. 
Substantial evidence on the record supports the trial court's substantially equal 
distribution of property. A rough outline of the division of assets saw a total community net 
equity of $220,807.87 distributed $98,076.04 to Mrs. Moffett and $122,731.83 to Mr. Moffett. 
This is roughly a forty five percent (45%) to fifty five percent (55%) split. But, these figures do 
not include the amount Mr. Moffett was required by the court to pay to have a well installed on 
his awarded property, since the previous well was now on Mrs. Moffett's awarded property, the 
pasture rental income that Mrs. Moffett would continue to accrue, the fact Mrs. Moffett was 
awarded essentially all of the parties liquid equity, and that the property awarded Mr. Moffett 
was valued at $385,000 at most. Ifone takes the value of the property awarded to Mr. Moffett 
that was established by substantial evidence on the record, there was a community net equity of 
$155,807.87, distributed $98,076.04 to Mrs. Moffett and $57,731.83 to Mr. Moffett. This is 
roughly a forty five percent (63%) to fifty five percent (37%) split. 
D. Even if the trial court did not make a substantially equal division of the 
community, it did not abuse its discretion in dividing the community 
If, in the alternative, this Court decides that the trial court has made a distribution that is 
not substantially equal, than the proper standard for review is whether the trial judge abused his 
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discretion. Bailey, 107 Idaho at 327. The test for whether a trial court has abused its discretion is 
a three tiered analysis. Stewart, 143 Idaho at 679-680. The first tier is whether the Magistrate 
correctly viewed the issue as one of discretion. Id. (citing Chandler, 136 Idaho at 249, 32 P.3d at 
143). The second is whether the Court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices. Id. Lastly is, whether the 
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. 
E. Conclusion 
Judge Griffin did not abuse his discretion in distributing the parties' assets. He did view 
the issue as one of discretion. He held a two day and provided a detailed order, and 
supplemental orders, that outlined the division of property. A split of equity 45% to 55% is not 
outside the outer limits of the trial judge's discretion, especially when that judge is the trier of 
facts in a heavily contested case. This is particularly true when the liquid nature of the equity is 
taken into account, along with the fact that the party receiving the larger share of the equity was 
obligated to pay a much higher monthly mortgage and a large monthly child support amount. R 
at pg 185. A proper valuation of the real property awarded to Mr. Moffett shows that Mrs. 
Moffett actual received a 63% share of the net equity. Judge Griffin reached his division of 
property in a reasoned manner as evident by the detailed opinions and many court and telephonic 
hearings conducted by the parties. R. at pg 30-132 and Appellant's Exhibits 1 and 2, et all. 
The trial judge in this matter made a substantially equal division of property. This is 
supported by substantial evidence on the record. Even if it is not and a non substantially equal 
division was effectuated, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in reaching his division. It 
also would not be equitable at this time to award anymore of Mr. Moffett's property to the 
appellant as he has only recently emerged from the bankruptcy caused by the debt assigned to 
him and was recently ordered to pay Mrs. Moffett's attorney fees and costs of nearly $40,000 for 
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the trial on their motions to modify. R. at pg. 300-15. Therefore, this Court should uphold the 
trial court's division of property. 
IV. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Appellant's Request For 
Spousal Maintenance. 
A. Introduction 
Spousal maintenance is at the discretion of a trial court if the requesting party can 
initially show that they lack "sufficient property to provide for his or her reasonable needs" AND 
are "unable to support himself or herself through employment." I.e. § 32-705(1). It is not a 
vested right from a marriage. Jackson v. Jackson, 87 Idaho 330, 334, 393 P.2d 28, 30 (1964). 
Instead, it is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court and is subject to modification. 
Id. That discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of manifest abuse therefore. 
Glavin v. Glavin, 94 Idaho 813, 816,498 P.2d 1286,1289 (1972). 
Appellate courts review a trial court's denial or issuance of spousal maintenance under a 
three part abuse of discretion analysis. Stewart. 143 Idaho at 679-680, 152 P.3d at 550-51. The 
first tier is whether the Magistrate correctly viewed the issue of spousal maintenance as one of 
discretion.ld. (citing Chandler, 136 Idaho at 249,32 P.3d at 143). The second is whether the 
Court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to specific choices. Id. Lastly, whether the court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. Id. 
B. Financial condition of the parties in the main inquiry in spousal maintenance, not 
fault of either party 
Fault is no longer the primary focus of the spousal maintenance statute. In 1990, the 
Idaho Legislature amended the spousal maintenance statute to take away fault in the divorce as 
the underlying prerequisite the statute. Tisdale v. Tisdale, 127 Idaho 331,335, 900 P.2d 807,811 
(Ct.App.1992). The primary focus in whether or not to award spousal maintenance is now the 
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parties financial condition at the time of the trial court's ruling, if the first requirements ofl.C. § 
32-705(1) are met. Id. 
C. Stewart does not support the Appellant's position 
Appellant incorrectly relies on Stewart. 143 Idaho at 673, 152 P.3d at 544. Appellant 
seems to be relying on the facts of Stewart as establishing some precedent for the award of 
spousal maintenance that was denied by Judge Griffin at the trial level. However, as referenced 
by the District Judge below, Stewart does not provide authority to a finding that Judge Griffin 
clearly abused his discretion in denying Appellant's request for spousal maintenance. The Court 
in Stewart merely decided that the Magistrate had not abused his discretion in awarding spousal 
maintenance, not that spousal maintenance must have been awarded. Id. at 680-81. 
There are additional factual differences between Stewart and the present case. In 
Stewart, the Magistrate noted that Mr. Stewart, the spouse who ordered to pay spousal 
maintenance, earned approximately twenty five (25) times the yearly income of Mrs. Stewart. Id. 
at 680. In this matter, the Magistrate found that the Appellant's yearly income was $ 15,000 per 
year and the Respondent's yearly income was $ 66,000. R. at pg. 36. This ratio of four to one 
(4: 1) is vastly different from the twenty five to one ratio (25: 1) in Stewart. In Stewart, the 
Magistrate noted that Mrs. Stewart's disability would eventually render her unable to support 
herself financially. Stewart, 143 Idaho at 680. In this matter, the Magistrate did not note any 
inability of the Appellant to work in the future and noted that she had a neurological disorder but 
had been dealing with it since childhood. R. at pg. 39. These differences make Stewart factually 
and significantly different from the present case, especially as it relates to I.C. § 32-705(l)(b), 
the ability of the requesting spouse to herself through employment and determining lifestyle 
present during marriage. 
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D. Disagreement with trial court's decision is not the same as an abuse of discretion, 
especially where the trial court has correctly applied all of the relevant legal 
standards 
Mere disagreement with a Magistrate's denial of spousal maintenance is not tantamount 
to an abuse of discretion. Magistrate Judge Griffin did not abuse his discretion and the three tier 
analysis from Stewart confirms this view. Judge Griffin clearly saw the awarding of spousal 
maintenance as an issue in his discretion. His Order from August 11, 2004 in regards to 
"Spousal Maintenance" discusses ten (10) separate areas of inquiry that he evaluated in making 
his decision to deny Appellant's request for spousal maintenance. R. at pg. 39. While Judge 
Griffin did not explicitly state that the evaluation of this issue was one of discretion, his 
discussion of the issues and factors to be considered affirm that he viewed it as such. R. at pg. 
39-40. 
Judge Griffin's evaluation of Appellant spousal maintenance claimed was within the 
outer boundaries of his discretion and was consistent with the legal standards of the Idaho 
Code's spousal maintenance statute. Judge Griffin was inside the outer boundaries of his 
discretion in denying spousal maintenance as seen in comparing this matter to the denial of 
spousal maintenance in Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448,80 P.3d 1049 (2003). In 
Hoskinson, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a Magistrate's denial of spousal maintenance was 
not an abuse of discretion following a factual pattern similar to his case. Id. 139 Idaho at 463, 80 
P.3d at 1064. Despite allegations of adultery and extreme cruelty, disparate income of the 
parties, and unequal distribution of community property, the Court decided that the Magistrate 
did not abuse his discretion in denying spousal maintenance because he carefully examined most 
of the factors under I.e. § 32-705 and made a decision based on his discretionary review. Id. I.C. 
§ 32-705 contains the following factors relevant to spousal maintenance awards: 
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1. Where a divorce is decreed, the court may grant a maintenance order if it 
finds that the spouse seeking maintenance: 
(a) Lacks sufficient property to provide for his or her reasonable needs; and 
(b) Is unable to support himself or herself through employment. 
2. The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such periods of 
time that the court deems just, after considering all relevant factors which may 
include: 
(a) The financial resources of the spouse seeking maintenance, including the 
marital property apportioned to said spouse, and said spouse's ability to meet 
his or her needs independently; 
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to enable 
the spouse seeking maintenance to find employment; 
(c) The duration of the marriage; 
(d) The age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking 
maintenance; 
(e) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his or 
her needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance; 
(f) The tax consequences to each spouse; 
(g) The fault of either party. 
Judge Griffin noted considerations under all of these factors. He awarded each party an 
equal share of the parties' assets. Rat pg. 40. Included in the Appellant's share of the assets was 
a stock account and a checking account worth approximately $ 24,065 and easy to liquidate. Rat 
pg. 40. The Appellant was also awarded approximately $ 100,000 in equity from personal and 
real property, compared to roughly the same for the Respondent. Rat pg. 41-42. He noted the 
Appellant was currently employed full time and even worked some overtime as a unit supervisor 
for the emergency room at Tri-State Hospital. Rat pg. 39. He noted that the Appellant was 
interested in becoming a registered nurse and would two more years of education to accomplish 
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this goal. Rat pg. 39. He noted the parties were married for thirteen (13) years. Rat pg. 39. He 
noted that the Appellant was thirty six (36) years old. Rat pg. 39. She recently had a gallbladder 
surgery and might have to have a hysterectomy. Rat pg. 39. He also noted her neurological 
disorder. Rat pg. 39. He discussed the Respondent's income. Rat pg. 39. He generally 
discussed tax implications in a variety of contexts. Rat pg. 38 and 40. He also noted that both 
parties had engaged in openly adulterous relationships during the marriage and that the 
Respondent had been violent towards the Appellant after the separation. Rat pg. 37. 
E. Conclusion 
Judge Griffin reached his decision to not award spousal maintenance based on reason. 
His decision was based on reason because it followed a proper evaluation of the factors outlined 
I.e. § 32-705, which is the applicable legal standard. Rat pg. 39-40. He noted that an equitable 
distribution ofthe assets was achieved and that the Appellant was still able to maintain full 
employment. Rat pg. 39-40. These factors combined with the fact that approximately $ 24,000 
ofthe Appellant's equity was liquid, led Judge Griffin to reasonably conclude that an award of 
spousal maintenance was not appropriate. Therefore, in applying the three tiered analysis of 
Chandler, the Magistrate below did not abuse his discretion and the denial of spousal 
maintenance to the Appellant should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully requests that this Court affirm the rulings of the District Court 
and Magistrate Court in this case. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -- 27 
DA TED this ~H- day of August, 2010. 
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THE COX LAW FIRM, PLLC 
/~ '-D 
.=:~)<----- Jf:z~ 
@AN C. BEAVER, of the firm 
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